TippingPoint Zero Day Initiative

(0Day) Rocket Servergraph Admin Center for TSM userRequest/tsmRequest Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

ZDI-14-164: June 2nd, 2014


CVSS Score

Affected Vendors

Affected Products

TippingPoint™ IPS Customer Protection

TippingPoint IPS customers are protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 13848, 13850, 13851. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS:

Vulnerability Details

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Rocket Servergraph Admin Center for Tivoli Storage Manager. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the userRequest servlet. It is possible to inject arbitrary operating system commands when the servlet is processing auth, auth_session, auth_simple, add, add_flat, remove, set_pwd, add_permissions, revoke_permissions, runAsync, and tsmRequest commands. A remote attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute remote code under the context of the SYSTEM user.

Vendor Response

Rocket Software states:

This vulnerability is being disclosed publicly without a patch in accordance with the ZDI vulnerability disclosure policy on lack of vendor response.

Vendor Contact Timeline:
04/16/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact
04/16/2014 - Automated reply from vendor
05/12/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact
05/12/2014 - Automated reply from vendor
05/05/2014 - ZDI telephoned vendor's support line and were told we would receive a callback (no callback)
05/19/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact
05/19/2014 - Automated reply from vendor
05/21/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact and indicated final attempt/intent to move toward 0-day
06/02/2014 - Public release of advisory

-- Mitigation:
Given the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the service should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles.

Disclosure Timeline

    2014-04-16 - Initial contact attempt with vendor
    2014-06-02 - Public release of advisory


This vulnerability was discovered by:
    Andrea Micalizzi (rgod)